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Abstract
Inspired by Fujita’s analysis [Quantum inf. & comput. 12(3&4), 2012], we
suggest a twice-encryption scheme to improve the security of the original
quantum McEliece public-key encryption algorithm.
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The security of McEliece public-key cryptosystem (PKC) [1] relies on
the difficulty of decoding general linear codes, an NP-complete problem.
McEliece PKC has been analyzed for more than thirty years, and is still
regarded as a secure one. It is generally accepted that quantum computer
cannot solve NP-complete problems in polynomial time, so McEliece PKC is
expected to be one that can resist quantum attacks. Ref. [2] extends it to a
public-key encryption algorithm for quantum messages. This quantum PKC
degenerates to original McEliece PKC while the plaintext state is restricted
to single superposition component, then it is secure to encrypt classical mes-
sages. Based on the idea of this quantum PKC, we introduce a new concept
named induced trapdoor one-way quantum transformation [3] and a general
framework of quantum PKC.
Recently, Fujita [4] proposes another quantum PKC based on stabilizer
codes, and finds a vulnerability of the original quantum McEliece PKC in
Ref. [2]. His argument is that since the attacking with only cipher state
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∑
m αm|mG⊕ e〉 can be reduced to attacking with the quantum state
X(eG−)
∑
m
αm|m〉, (1)
and the statistical distribution of X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉 over conjugate bases
is the same as that of the quantum message
∑
m αm|m〉, the adversary can
get some information of
∑
m αm|m〉 from X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉, though these
two sets of amplitudes are not the same.
The vulnerability of PKC in Ref. [2] is due to the lack of phase encryption.
We suggest here a twice-encryption scheme to overcome this problem. Alice
firstly uses one public key (G, t) to encrypt a k-qubit message
∑
m αm|m〉,
and obtains an n-qubit state
∑
m αm|mG ⊕ e〉, then performs Hadamard
transformation H⊗n, and obtains an n-qubit state, finally she encrypts the
n-qubit state with another public key (G2, t2).
Now we consider its security. Let G−1 ,G
−
2 are right inverse matrices of
G1andG2, respectively. Similar to the analysis presented in [4], we can find
that the cipher state only attack can be realized via attacking the state
X(e2G
−
2 )H
⊗n∑
m
αm|mG⊕ e〉. (2)
From the relations
X(e2G
−
2 )H
⊗n∑
m
αm|mG⊕ e〉 = H⊗nZ(e2G−2 )
∑
m
αm|mG⊕ e〉
= H⊗n
∑
m
αm(−1)(e2G−2 )·(mG⊕e)|mG⊕ e〉, (3)
we know that the attacker can perform H⊗n on the above quantum state, and
then perform a transformation defined by G−, and finally obtain the state
X(eG−)
∑
m αm(−1)(e2G
−
2 )·(mG⊕e)|m〉. We can see that both bit-flip errors
and phase errors are introduced into the final state, the attacker can only
obtain a state of probability distribution identical with that of the cipherstate
of the first encryption. Thus, the twice-encryption scheme can overcome the
vulnerability of PKC in Ref. [2]. This is similar to the private quantum
channel[6], in which 2-bit key is used to encrypt each qubit perfectly [7].
In the same way, the quantum PKCs in Ref. [3] can also be improved with
twice-encryption method. It can be seen that the twice-encryption scheme
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is still simpler than that suggested in Ref. [4].
Some points in Ref. [4] are worth to be clarified.
• PKC in Ref. [2] is insecure while encrypting classical messages.
Ref. [4] argues that the PKC in Ref. [2] is insecure while encrypting clas-
sical messages. We can see that it is suffice to consider the state X(eG−)|m〉
in this case. Because X(eG−)|m〉 = |m ⊕ eG−〉, attacking cipher state
X(eG−)|m〉 is equivalent to attacking m ⊕ eG−. Decoding m ⊕ eG− is at
least the same hard as decrypting mG⊕e which is just the cipher of classical
McEliece PKC. Now,we prove the fact that decoding m⊕ eG− is as hard as
solving a “learning parity with noise” (LPN) problem, which is NP-complete.
Here G = SG0P , where S, P are both invertible matrices, G0 is generator
matrix of Goppa code and is full row rank, so G is also full row rank, and
then it has Moore-Penrose inverse. Suppose G−1 is one of Moore-Penrose
inverses of G satisfying GG−1 = I. In fact, G
−
1 can be obtained by solving
the linear equations GX = I. Then all the Moore-Penrose inverses of G can
be written as the form
G− = G−1 ⊕ U ⊕G−1 GU,
where U is any n × k binary matrix. It can be verified that GG− = I.
In classical McEliece PKE scheme, the cipher c and plaintext m satisfy the
relation c = mG ⊕ e, where e is a binary row vector of weight t. Suppose
Eve finds another Moore-Penrose inverse of G, denoted as G−2 , then he can
compute cG−2 = m⊕ eG−2 . Denote G−2 = (e1 · · · ek), where each ei is a binary
column vector. Then cG−2 can be represented as (m1⊕e·e1), · · · , (mk⊕e·ek).
If each column ei of G
−
2 has more zeros (it means the Hamming weight of
ei is small enough), e · ei would equal to 0 with large probability, then its
i−th bit mi⊕ e · ei would reveal the i−th bit of original plaintext with large
probability. Notice that ei = gi ⊕ (I ⊕ G−1 G)ui, where gi and ui are the
i−th column of G−1 and U separately. Here gi and I ⊕ G−1 G are known,
but ui is unknown. Now Eve have to face a problem: finding ui, such that
gi ⊕ (I ⊕G−1 G)ui has weight smaller than a given value. This is just a LPN
problem, which is a NP-complete problem. This problem can be seen from
another view. I⊕G−1 G is a n×n matrix, and gi, ui are two n×1 vectors, but
ui is unknown. So the above problem can be restated as follow: how to select
some columns of I⊕G−1 G, such that their summation is closest to vector gi?
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This is just a closest vector problem (CVP), which is a NP-hard problem.
Thus, attacking via m⊕ eG− is as hard as solving an NP-complete problem.
NP-complete problem is believed to be intractable by quantum computer.
Then, we know that the PKC in Ref. [2] is secure while encrypting classical
messages.
We have tried numerical experiment following the above attack, and it
seems that this kind of attack is invalid. This attack is reduced to an optimal
problem (CVP): finding ui, such as gi ⊕ (I ⊕ G−1 G)ui (notice that it equals
ei) has weight smaller than a given value. Suppose the parameters n =
1024, k = 524, t = 50 in the McEliece PKC scheme. Firstly, because ui has
21024 choices, both the exhaustive search and random search are not realistic.
While choosing some small parameters such as n = 60, k = 30, the exhaustive
search can reduce the weight of ei to 1 with probability 2%, and the random
search may be slightly better. With the greedy search, we obtain ei of weight
225 on average. In this case, Pr[e · ei = 0] ≈ 0.5 + 0.1 × 10−13, here e is
a n-bit random vector of weight t = 50. Thus, the attack presented here is
invalid. 
• The state X(eG−)∑m αm|m〉 is equivalent to the ciphertext∑
m αm|mG⊕ e〉.
It is worth to notice that, with respect to Bob, the two states
∑
m αm|mG
⊕e〉 and X(eG−)∑m αm|m〉 are essentially inequivalent. Bob cannot decrypt
quantum message from the latter since that there is a trapdoor in the one-
way quantum transformation
∑
m αm|m〉 −→
∑
m αm|mG ⊕ e〉, but not in∑
m αm|m〉 −→ X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉. This problem has been thoroughly in-
vestigated and developed into a general method for constructing trapdoor
one-way transformation in Ref. [3]. 
• The relation of two states with identical probability distribution over
some bases.
Conjugate bases measurement on the couple of states X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉
and
∑
m αm|m〉 will result in the identical statistical probability[4]. This is
obvious since the two states differ only in some bit-flips[5]. Fujita points out
[4] that the attacker may obtain some information about the quantum mes-
sage via measurement on X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉. His analysis is right though
4
we would like to stress that the similarity of states X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉 and∑
m αm|m〉 is described by the fidelity
F (r) =
∣∣∣∣∣
(∑
m
α∗m〈m|
)
X(r)
(∑
n
αn|n〉
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
m,n
α∗mαn〈m|X(r)|n〉
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
m
α∗mαm⊕r
∣∣∣∣∣ , (4)
where r = eG− is a random string depending on the error e. It can be seen
that F (r) may equals to any value from 0 to 1, then, generally speaking,
identical probability distributions do not means identical states. 
In addition, we would like to mention that it is sufficient to adopt once-
encryption scheme in some low-level security scenario besides encrypting clas-
sical message. According to Holevo’s theorem, the quantum measurement
on X(eG−)
∑
m αm|m〉 can obtain at most k-bit information, but
∑
m αm|m〉
has 2k amplitudes αm, and each αm is l-bit complex number which has both
real and imaginary parts, so it is necessary to obtain 2l× 2k-bit information
for determining an unknown state
∑
m αm|m〉. Even if Alice encrypts the
same quantum state polynomial times, the attacker can only obtain at most
a polynomial-bits information. We can see that it is still hard for her to
determine the state
∑
m αm|m〉.
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